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The Politics of Social 
Enterprise
Learning objectives
In this chapter we critically evaluate the global political context in which social enter-
prise has developed, and give further consideration to the influence of new public 
management and new public governance. Key to this chapter is understanding and 
acting on the tension created by the ascendancy of private sector practices in public 
and third sector organisations, and the way actors in the social and solidarity economy 
have responded to those tensions in innovative ways. By the end of this chapter you 
will be able to:
•	 explain the concepts of globalisation and localisation•	 explain the concepts of new public management and new public governance •	 describe the impact of NPM on public–private–third sector relationships during and 
after the 1980s•	 critically evaluate how local government and organisations in the social economy 
responded to NPM•	 illustrate how social enterprise (internationally) is both an economic and political 
response.
3
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Introduction
In this chapter, we adopt a perspective that is relatively rare in the study of social 
enterprise. As we set out in Chapter 2, existing texts advance the idea that social 
enterprise can take the form of CTAs or CMEs within the third sector. Alternatively, 
they are framed as a product of interactions between the private, state and third sector 
actors to produce SRBs. In this chapter, we consider an alternative view that social 
enterprise is a product of the tensions between attempts to privatise the delivery of 
public services and the radical responses of local politicians and CMEs with socialist 
sympathies.
We live at a time when the private economy (notionally the source of wealth) is the 
most subsidised sector of the economy. During the 2007–8 economic crisis, the help 
given to private organisations in the UK and US dwarfed the help given to organisa-
tions in the social economy. The New Economics Foundation (nef) estimated that 
the UK’s ‘big four’ banks received subsidies to the value of £35 billion in 2012 in 
addition to the ‘bail out’ investments made by the government (Prieg, 2012). This took 
the cumulative additional banking subsidy to £193 billion since 2007, six times greater 
than the value of all grants and donations to the charity sector, and nearly twice the 
turnover of the co-operative and mutual sector. When considered alongside arguments 
about the creation of money (Positive Money, 2012), political claims about the 
‘efficiency’ of private markets look (at best) unsound and (at worst) compromised.
The link to contemporary social enterprise is not immediately obvious, so initially 
we review the way economics developed, then changed, before and after the 1970s. 
The key arguments that will be developed  
in this chapter are:
•	 Attempts to create global markets in goods and services are a recurrent cycle in 
economic history.•	 Globalisation enables new forms of socially responsible businesses (SRBs), but 
also triggers charitable trading activities (CTAs) and co-operative and mutual 
enterprises (CMEs) to limit/resist globalisation.•	 The pursuit of NPM in the 1980s/1990s was a formative influence on the 
current practice of spinning out social enterprises from the public sector.•	 The social economy response to NPM involved the advancement of employee 
ownership and support for the solidarity economy.
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In particular, we examine the roots, popularisation and impact of neo-liberalism, and 
the effect this had on ‘left-of-centre’ entrepreneurship. In outline, the argument runs 
as follows:
1. A breakdown in the post-war political consensus regarding macro-economic man-
agement and full employment coincided with the rise of the ‘new right’ in politics.
2. The ‘new right’ advanced a set of principles that led to new public management as 
a way of legitimising SRBs in public administration.
3. The ‘new left’ (a loose alliance of people holding anarchist, socialist and social 
democratic beliefs) responded through regeneration activities based on CMEs.
4. New Labour (in the UK) and social democratic parties across the EU adopted 
supply-side economics combined with commitments to social justice, equality and 
employment protection as a third way.
5. The three approaches to social enterprise emerged out of the tensions between 
liberal capitalist ideas embedded in NPM and the market socialism that responded 
to it.
6. By the 1990s, both SRBs and CMEs had prepared institutional challenges to ‘old’ 
public, private and third sector development, and this triggered further CTAs in the 
voluntary sector by the mid/late 2000s.
To appreciate this perspective, it is first necessary to consider the history of global 
economic systems that led up to the breakdown of the post-war consensus (before 
and after 1945, up to 1976). We then set out the central tenets of new public manage-
ment (Hood, 1995) and the reactions of progressive liberal and socialist politicians 
(Chandler, 2008) who initially favoured SRBs and CMEs. Recent analysis links private 
sector development to growing income inequalities, rates of suicide, community 
breakdown and endemic health issues, and this has fuelled interest in new models of 
ownership (Gates, 1998; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). We highlight the intersection of 
SRBs and CMEs with public sector reform, while concurrently highlighting their grow-
ing popularity as a way to address inefficiencies in the private sector. 
Class exercise: Do you believe in the efficiency  
of markets?
A significant proportion of adults (both young and old) distrust politics and politi-
cians. The Political Compass is an interesting project that enables a person to find 
out what their political values are, and how these compare to past and present 
political parties as well as figures from history. It shows how political parties (includ-
ing the UK’s Labour, Liberal, Conservative and Green parties) have changed their 
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values over time. Most have moved from anti-authoritarian, left-leaning policies 
to authoritarian right-wing policies. According to the Political Compass, most 
Green parties today occupy the space that Labour parties occupied in the 1970s. 
Labour parties are now more right-wing and authoritarian than the Conservative/
Tory parties were in the 1970s.
Activity: www.politicalcompass.org/ 
1 Ask your students to take the Political Compass test before the seminar (or bring 
a tablet, smartphone or laptop to do it in class).
2 Discuss the dimensions of the ‘compass’: the right–left dimension and the 
authoritarian–libertarian dimension.
3 Ask students to locate charitable trading activities, socially responsible busi-
nesses and co-operative and mutual enterprises on the political compass.
After establishing students’ view of the political commitments of different types of 
social enterprise, play this video to generate further discussion and reflection:
Video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=tskByXRGHjY
The rise of global capital and 
international markets
Gray (1998) traces the concept of globalisation back to the rise of merchant capitalism, 
exemplified by the East India Company. In this venture, investors shared the risks of 
international trade by jointly funding the establishment of trading routes to all parts 
of the globe to insulate individual ships and crews from local disputes. Today, the 
concept of globalisation has taken on many shades of meaning, all linked to the tech-
nological, business and social institutions that make it possible to trade with people 
anywhere in the world. As Gray states:
Globalisation is shorthand for the cultural changes that follow when societies become 
linked with, and in varying measures dependent on, world markets … Behind all these 
‘meanings’ of globalization is a single underlying idea, which can be called de-localization: 
the uprooting of activities and relationships from local origins and cultures. It means the 
displacement of activities that until recently were local into networks of relationships 
whose reach is distant or worldwide. (2009: 57)
As the scale of ventures increased, so a banking system developed to support them. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, a group of nations adopted the ‘gold standard’ to 
facilitate international trade. The idea behind the gold standard was surprisingly simple. 
03_Ridley-Duff_Ch_03.indd   91 9/22/2015   5:47:13 PM
92 Theoretical Perspectives 
National governments backed their currencies with reserves of gold and agreed an 
exchange rate between their own local currency and international gold reserves. This 
was expected to make it easier to trade internationally as national governments com-
mitted not only to using their gold reserves to settle international debts but also to 
securing the value of their local currencies with something of tangible value.
Gray (2009) regards this period (from 1871 to 1914) as the first of two in recent 
history when international trade was dominated by institutions that used the rhetoric 
of free markets to secure advantage for industrialised economies. The first period 
came to an abrupt end when World War I broke out. As Block writes:
The gold standard was intended to create an integrated global marketplace that reduced 
the role of national units and national governments, but its consequences were exactly 
the opposite. Polanyi shows that when it was widely adopted in the 1870s, it had the 
ironic effect of intensifying the importance of the nation as a unified entity. Although 
market liberals dreamed of a pacified world in which the only international struggles 
would be those of individuals and firms to outperform their competitors, their efforts 
to realize these dreams through the gold standard produced two horrific world wars. 
(2001: xxxi)
Important to an understanding of social enterprise movements now, however, is a 
second period during which international institutions again sought to create a global 
economy, this time based on fluctuating currencies. According to Gray (2009), the 
second period occurred from the late 1970s (coinciding with rise to power of Margaret 
Thatcher in the UK, Ronald Reagan in the US and Deng Xiaoping in China) until the 
collapse of confidence in global capitalism in 2007–8. In 2008, governments again had 
to provide financial and social security by taking over major parts of the banking 
system. Polanyi’s words, first published in 1944, are extraordinarily prescient given the 
situation that developed in 2008:
The true nature of the international system under which we were living was not realized 
until it failed. Hardly anyone understood the political function of the international mon-
etary system; the awful suddenness of the transformation took the world completely by 
surprise … Not even when the cataclysm was already upon them did their leaders see 
that behind the collapse of the international system there stood a long development 
within the most advanced countries that made that system anachronistic; in other words, 
the failure of market economy itself still escaped them. (2001 [1944]: 21)
Importantly, for contemporary debates on social enterprise, Polanyi argued that liberal 
economic theory fails to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ commodities. Three 
items are singled out for discussion: labour, money and land (either in the form of 
natural resources or the properties we need to live). The assumptions of globalisation 
extend beyond the trade of tangible goods and services to the commodification of 
money (through currency speculation), labour (by removing collective bargaining rights 
and minimum wage protection) and land (through attaching prices to the natural 
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resources required for living). Polanyi argues, in sharp contrast to Fukuyama’s (1995) 
advocacy of high-trust liberalism, that during historical periods in which money, labour 
and land are treated as commodities, commerce destroys social capital and the natural 
environment. However, he stops short of condemning the market mechanism com-
pletely. So long as it trades in ‘real’ goods, it can be an important part of a mixed 
economy in which reciprocity and redistribution are also active principles (Hart, 2013). 
This clear departure from the followers of Marx meant that Polanyi’s work became 
less popular amongst left-leaning policy makers. But with the rise of social enterprise, 
his argument that markets can play a limited role (providing they trade in ‘real’ goods), 
and work with democratic institutions and member-owned enterprises to generate and 
distribute wealth, puts his contribution at the heart of social enterprise theory. 
(Nyssens, 2006)
Gray explains why the commodification of money leads to banking crises:
Transactions in foreign exchange markets have now reached the astonishing sum of … 
over 50 times the level of world trade. Around 95 per cent of these transactions are 
speculative in nature, many using complex new derivative financial instruments based on 
futures and options. (2009: 57)
As Erdal (2011) would later argue, nearly all transactions in global financial markets 
produce nothing of tangible value (i.e. a product or a service that has direct utility 
value outside the financial sector). Vast quantities of labour (and money) are engaged 
in ‘casino capitalism’, producing ‘fictitious’ goods and services. If currency values bear 
little relation to the trading of ‘real’ goods, they will eventually destabilise markets and 
increase economic volatility.
However, the situation today is even more entrenched because of the way the com-
moditisation of money has been taken to extreme levels by fractional reserve banking. 
This allows the lending (again and again) of an amount of money before the principal 
has been repaid. The only deduction necessary is the ‘fraction’ that regulators require 
the bank to hold in reserve to service their cash flow needs (Positive Money, 2012). 
Since the switch to digital transactions through online bank accounts and credit/debit 
cards, banks have started to lend digital money (without anything to underpin its 
value). The Positive Money movement estimates that 97 per cent of the money now 
circulating is created ‘out of thin air’ by private banks (not governments), bears little 
relationship to the ‘real’ goods and services in the economy, and increases the volume 
of money traded as a commodity.
These critiques have a powerful salience today. They highlight how ‘fictitious’ mar-
kets in labour, money and land are implicated in the failure of market institutions and 
state bodies. In the next section, we examine in more detail the doctrines that led to 
this commodification and how this changed the balance of power between those with 
money (banks and corporations) and those with political power (governments and 
social movements).
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The end of the post-war consensus
Polanyi’s hopes for a more mixed economy (under state influence) were advanced 
initially through the application of Keynesian economics. This supported an expan-
sionary policy with the state actively regulating aspects of the economy. The main 
critique of Keynes came from the Chicago School of economists who argued that 
government intervention is the source of the boom and bust cycle by contributing to 
inflationary policies that make recessions worse (Sloman and Sutcliffe, 2001: 598). 
They argued that government should limit itself to regulating the supply of money. 
These views, associated strongly with Milton Friedman (1968), came to be seen as 
supply-side economics. The goal was to regulate inflation and employment by matching 
the supply of money (monetarism) to the productive capacity of the economy.
Class exercise: Positive money
In the YouTube video at the link below, the Positive Money movement explains how 
money is created and who benefits from its creation. Watch (the first 10 minutes of) 
this video and consider the following questions:
1 In a modern economy, who controls the creation of money?
2 Who profits from the creation of money?
3 What issues arise in using this system to regulate the supply of money to the 
economy?
4 How could the right to create money be changed to finance the public (or 
community) sectors?
Video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3mfkD6Ky5o
Hood (1995) outlines a deep shift in both accounting and management practices 
that reflected the supply-side arguments of monetarism, leading to a diminishing 
role for the state as a manager of public enterprises, and ending the state’s role as 
the employer of choice in public services and utilities. Gradually, politicians 
accepted arguments to withdraw from direct provision and either use taxes to com-
mission services from third parties, or privatise service delivery. Hood argues that 
this spread gradually, but not completely, across OECD countries. It took root 
quickly in the UK, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Sweden, partially in France, 
Austria, Norway, Ireland and Finland, but not at all in Japan, Greece, Spain and 
Turkey (until much later).
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Klein (2007), however, argues that Friedman’s advocacy of monetarism was 
advanced by capitalising on disasters – both accidental and manufactured – rather 
than its intrinsic merits. She argues that the private sector spread New Right thinking 
through media empires that were not controlled by the state (Chomsky and Herman, 
1988). It was not until the internet age that counter-arguments could be spread rapidly 
through new democratised forms of communication and publishing. 
A persuasive (and amusing) critique of the effects of new right thinking occurs in 
the work of Harvey (2010). He supports Klein’s contention that crises are an important 
aspect of the capitalist system because holders of larger amounts of capital secure the 
benefits of a fall in market values (through their greater capacity to absorb losses and 
buy up assets from bankruptcies and insolvencies). Harvey questions whether those 
favouring a capitalist economy have any satisfactory solution to crises, and postulates 
that capitalists are shifting the crises around geographically rather than confronting or 
solving inherent weaknesses of the system. If we consider the Asian crisis in 1997, the 
South American crisis in 2001, the UK/US crisis in 2007–8, and then the EU sovereign 
debt crises in 2012, Harvey’s argument looks credible.
Class exercise: David Harvey’s ‘The crises  
of capitalism’
In this RSA animation (link below), David Harvey examines how the 2007–8 crisis 
came about. Following Klein, he sees method in the madness of crises, and calls 
for an anti-capitalist response. Consider the geo-politics that Harvey describes and 
then consider the emergence of social enterprise. Do you think that social enter-
prises are emerging today as an anti-capitalist response? Or are social enterprises a 
new part of the existing capitalist system?
1 Which of the explanations of the 2007–8 crisis provided by David Harvey do you 
find most persuasive?
2 Will CTAs, SRBs and CMEs be able to form an ‘anti-capitalist’ movement?
3 If yes, what makes these organisations anti-capitalist?
Video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOP2V_np2c0
The effects of new public management
Chandler (2008) views NPM as an ideological shift towards new right thinking in the 
management of public services, leading to arguments for the creation of SRBs and 
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contracts for CTAs. In the short term, this is manifest in programmes to privatise utility 
companies (gas, telecoms, water and electricity). In the longer term, and perhaps more 
significantly, NPM manifests itself in ‘doctrines’ that replace collaborative approaches 
based on political and professional judgement with target-driven approaches based on 
managerial control. Hood (1995) set out a number of ideological shifts as well as their 
operational and accounting implications. In Table 3.1, we examine one of the doctrines 
to understand the nature of the shifts that took place.
Table 3.1 One of the seven doctrines of new public management
Doctrine Justification Replaces 
Operational  
implications 
Accounting  
implications 
Transformation of 
public sector bodies 
into corporatised units 
organised to deliver 
discrete products and 
services 
Makes units manageable; 
focuses blame for failure; 
splits commissioning and 
production to reduce waste 
Belief in uniform, inclusive 
public sector; belief in 
collaborative approaches 
to public service provision 
Erosion of single service 
employment; arm’s-
length management to 
separate commissioning 
and provision of services; 
devolved budgeting 
More cost centres; 
move to activity-based 
costing (ABC) 
Source: Hood (1995), Table 1  Elsevier
The other doctrines included: more contract-based, competitive tendering with internal 
markets and fixed-term contracts; a greater emphasis on private sector styles of man-
agement; more stress on discipline and frugality in use of resources; more emphasis on 
visible hands-on top management; formalised standards and measures of performance 
and success; and a greater emphasis on output controls. Of note here is the move away 
from long-term employment, collaborative (and uniform) service provision towards 
decentralised units that compete both with each other and new kinds of service 
provider (charities, voluntary organisations, employee mutuals, private corporations).
Case 3.1 illustrates how practices associated with NPM influenced public sector 
reform, and can be linked to the potential development of both CMEs and SRBs. The 
National Health Service in the UK has been divided into commissioning and pro-
vider bodies to create a quasi-market. This was encouraged through a ‘right to request’ 
policy that allows staff to externalise existing services into discrete social enterprises.
Case 3.1
The ‘right to request’ in the UK National Health Service
The contemporary expression of NPM in the form of social enterprise can be 
found in the National Health Service (NHS) of the UK. In November 2008, the 
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NHS published Social Enterprise – Making a Difference: A Guide to the Right to 
Request. The ‘right to request’ allows any health professional to put a ‘business 
case’ to its primary care trust board to set up a social enterprise. The presenta-
tion of social enterprise to health professionals states that it is ‘fundamentally 
about business approaches to achieving public benefit’ (NHS, 2008: 6). The 
focus on innovation, reorganisation into business units providing discrete ser-
vices, and outcome-driven management is evident in the Chief Health Professions 
Officer’s statement:
Social enterprise will not be the answer for everyone, but allied health profes-
sionals have a long history of providing innovative services in a variety of 
sectors, settings and throughout care pathways and patient journeys. 
Consequently, allied health professionals are in an excellent position to take 
advantage of the ‘right to request’. This may be for a particular profession, 
such as podiatry or physiotherapy, a specialism such as musculoskeletal 
physiotherapy, a particular care group, or a combination of these. What is 
most important though is that this is about developing a service that will 
meet local need and maximise your potential to innovate and ultimately 
improve outcomes for patients, clients and families, whilst remaining part of 
the NHS family. (NHS, 2008: 3)
Interestingly, Hood finds it difficult to distinguish between a privatisation agenda and 
a social democratic reaction to NPM that uses social enterprise to limit the influence 
of the private sector:
It might be argued that NPM has been adopted in some contexts to ward off the New 
Right agenda for privatisation … and in other countries as the first step towards realizing 
that agenda. Much of NPM is built on the idea (or ideology) of homeostatic control; that 
is, the clarification of goals and missions in advance, and then building the accountabil-
ity systems in relation to those pre-set goals. (1995: 107)
Concern that ‘non-profits’ are being sucked into a ‘contracting culture’ (Dart, 
2004) is based on this analysis of the deep shift in management thought and an 
acceptance of business norms based on commercial contracts. Certainly, there are 
new providers who adopt a variety of hybrid models, including SRBs that mix 
employee ownership and private investment (for an example, see www.circle 
partnership.co.uk). This reflects a change in public policy to take away decision-
making from large strategic health authorities and give it to smaller clinical 
commissioning groups.
03_Ridley-Duff_Ch_03.indd   97 9/22/2015   5:47:13 PM
98 Theoretical Perspectives 
However, contracts typically embed new forms of management control and govern-
ance that are considerably less ‘empowering’ than the rhetoric accompanying them 
(Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996; Curtis, 2008). The increased formalisation (visioning, 
mission statements, audit), and the outcome-driven character of measurement (targets, 
service-level agreements and competition), represent a cultural shift to a legal-rational 
society based on homeostatic controls, rooted in cause–effect assumptions derived 
from positivist research. There are good reasons to question the efficacy of this. 
Hebson et al. (2003) found that the replacement of bureaucracy with contracting 
‘partners’ decreases opportunities for the collaborative decision-making that can deal 
with ‘complexity’ (Stacey, 2007). Transparency decreases and the use of legal remedies 
increases as service commissioners adapt to their monitoring function, and use their 
power to adjust rewards (i.e. pay) in line with service-level agreements. Where provid-
ers find they cannot meet these agreements (either through their own over-estimation 
of their capacity, or through unrealistic target setting based on false cause–effect 
assumptions by commissioners) they may ‘walk away’ and leave gaps in public service 
provision. Circle Partnership, two months after receiving a ‘business of the year’ award 
from the Employee Ownership Association, cancelled a contract with Lincolnshire 
NHS Trust to manage Hinchinbrook Hospital claiming that the terms of the agreement 
were unsustainable (BBC, 2015; Melton, 2015).
The current intention of many governments to allow a proliferation of ‘public ser-
vice mutuals’ (CMEs), public–private partnerships (SRBs) and voluntary sector 
partnerships (CTAs) poses a challenging question. Is this the continuation of NPM (in 
a new guise) or a multi-stakeholder turn in which networking and co-production of 
services signifies a switch to NPG? Osborne (2006) argues that NPM is gradually giving 
way to NPG by rejecting knowledge rooted in rational-choice theory and management 
studies in favour of sociological and network theories that provide greater scope for 
innovation (Coule and Patmore, 2013). Instead of decentralised units that operate in 
a quasi-market, NPG favours co-design and co-delivery models that create clusters of 
well-networked providers who have closer relationships with staff and service users 
(Hazenburg, 2014). Osborne (2006) foresaw this trend as neo-corporatist stemming 
from growing concerns that inter-organisational governance and collaboration in ser-
vice design was a key aspect of good quality public services. 
An extensive example of this collaboration is occurring throughout the health sec-
tor in Italy (CECOP-CICOPA Europe, 2015). According to Restakis (2010), from 1979 
onwards the city authorities started to agree contracts with newly formed social co-
operatives to provide care for people with mental health conditions. Restakis reports 
that about 8,000 such enterprises now exist in the Bologna region of Italy, in a com-
plex network of health organisations that co-design and co-deliver care. By law, 
beneficiaries must also be co-operative members. Borzaga and Depedri (2014) report 
on the staggering success of work integration social enterprises (helping people find 
productive work) that report a 65 per cent success rate over three years. This is two 
to three times higher than has been achieved by either private or trustee-led voluntary 
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sector organisations in the US or UK, and ten times higher than the UK government’s 
work programme (Gilbert et al., 2013).
For Chandler (2008), these developments would be a case of ‘local socialism’ that 
subverts the agenda of NPM to privatise the health care system and transforms it into 
a set of institutions that follow the norms of NPG. Through new CMEs, those receiving 
health care can own and control the service that serves them. As Restakis (2010) points 
out, this ‘real’ (rather than notional) ownership enables patients, carers and profession-
als to participate in governance and exercise their voice within the care system. They 
can also make (and fund, where practical) their own initiatives, increasing innovation 
and impact.
Advances in employee and community ownership
The rise of local socialism as a political response based on social enterprise develop-
ment is now acknowledged in historical research into the sector (Sepulveda, 2014). 
While Friedman’s (1962) advocacy of freedom and choice stimulated new attitudes to 
entrepreneurship throughout the western world, his views were oriented towards a 
consumer-led, not producer-led, economy. Despite making some persuasive argu-
ments that a vibrant market economy punishes producers who adopt discriminatory 
practices, Friedman’s (1962) rhetoric changes dramatically when talking of the rela-
tionship between the workforce, senior managers and shareholders. In this matter, he 
continued to advocate that the workforce (at all levels) should be subservient to the 
goal of maximising profit for (institutional) shareholders. While some concessions 
might be made to workers to align their sympathies with investors (through profit 
sharing), Friedman continued to argue against corporate social responsibility through-
out his life (Achbar et al., 2004).
Among American and Australian thinkers, democratisation of the workplace to com-
bine the strengths of SRBs and CMEs countered these attitudes. They advocated ‘shared 
capitalism’ (similar to ‘social economy’ within the EU) that limits the influence of stock 
market institutions and shares more wealth among producers and consumers (Ellerman, 
1990; Turnbull, 1994; Cathcart, 2009; Jensen, 2011). By the late 1980s, employee share 
ownership plans (ESOPs) pioneered in the US were being introduced around the 
globe. About 35 million employees participate in the US and 2 million in the UK. They 
hold shares in the company that employs them either directly or indirectly through a 
trust (ESOC, 2014; NCEO, 2014). However, as Melman (2001) discusses, despite 
Thatcherite rhetoric that share ownership would increase individuals’ control over their 
own destiny, these changes made little impact on the lives of workers or corporate 
practice in the majority of cases. Where shares do not confer control rights, they make 
little difference to the pattern of worker layoffs and management practices.
But, where control has passed to member-owners (instead of institutional investors), 
employee-owned businesses, co-operative companies and societies have started to 
03_Ridley-Duff_Ch_03.indd   99 9/22/2015   5:47:13 PM
100 Theoretical Perspectives 
outperform their private sector counterparts both economically and socially (Perotin 
and Robinson, 2004; Birchall, 2009; Erdal, 2014). In parts of northern Spain and Italy, 
the local economies that became dominated by co-operative networks of industrial 
companies, retailers, schools and universities have become some of the wealthiest 
regions in Europe. These have been linked to positive health outcomes and increased 
life expectancy (Erdal, 2014). The MCC in Spain (see Introduction to Part 1 and Case 3.3) 
provides an example of sustained economic and social development through CMEs. 
Notable innovations are the rejection of the employer–employee relationship (Ellerman, 
1990) and the distribution of power to separate governing bodies representing 
workforce, manager and owner interests (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Turnbull, 2002).
The significance of these developments is that they establish pluralist models of 
ownership where the legitimacy of worker ownership (either individually, collectively 
or a mix) is accepted alongside arrangements for member and third-party investments. 
Secondly, the co-operative movement is gradually accepting the argument that prac-
tices in SRBs (through recognition of suppliers, consumers and workers as ‘strategic 
stakeholders’) should inform the design of multi-stakeholder ownership and govern-
ance systems (Lund, 2011; Birchall, 2012; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2013). In both Italy and 
Canada, legal forms for ‘solidarity co-operatives’ are now well established (Lund, 
2011), and a coherent articulation based on a FairShares Model of social enterprise is 
emerging in English speaking cultures (Ridley-Duff and Southcombe, 2014).
The shift towards multi-stakeholder enterprise design comes from the evolution of 
the social and solidarity economy identified in Chapters 1 and 2. It challenges many 
of the assumptions in organisational theory that there must be unitary control of 
operations and decision-making by an executive. In this respect, it furrows a different 
path from conversions to social enterprise where management structures remain in 
place and only the goals of the enterprise change. In discussions of multi-stakeholder 
governance, technological changes accelerate, deepen and reduce the cost of applying 
mutual principles and designing systems for participatory democracy in (networks of) 
organisations (Murray, 2010).1
In this ‘sharing economy’ (Gold, 2004), the co-ordinating functions of managers can 
be coded into internet-based software to radically reduce the costs of both manage-
ment and democracy (Murray, 2010). Wikipedia (which democratises the production 
and consumption of knowledge) and the mass-movement tool Loomio (which decen-
tralises and democratises decision-making and governance) are current examples of 
systems that challenge the need for large executive/management teams. Through their 
adoption, members can re-acquire hegemonic control because the co-ordinating func-
tions of managers and administrators are largely handled in software. It puts members 
firmly back in control.
Nevertheless, this still leaves open questions of ownership raised by Major (1996, 
1998), particularly the issue of ‘equity degeneration’ – a situation where one or more 
stakeholders is unable to realise the full value of their past efforts, risk-taking, invest-
ments and decisions. In terms of finance, successful mutuals have had to sell equity 
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on the open market to obtain full value for employee or customer owners. For exam-
ple, Eaga plc, a public sector spinout that sought to end fuel poverty (see Case 3.2), 
changed itself from a company wholly owned by an employee trust to a plc that 
permitted external investors. In this configuration, managers bought a minority stake 
that gave them the balance of power, enabling them to enrich themselves through a 
private sale to Carillion. The perceived danger – realised in this case – is that ‘social 
ownership’ is eroded and replaced by private ownership in the same way that UK 
building societies and transport companies were demutualised in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Spear, 1999; Cook et al., 2002).
Case 3.2
Eaga plc: a public service under private or social control?
Eaga plc was formed from a public sector spinoff involving five members of staff 
who wanted to create an information and advice service for fuel poverty. Initially 
the company was structured as a CLG, but in 2000 it decided to switch to the 
model of ownership and control used by the John Lewis Partnership (based on an 
employee benefit trust, EBT). During this period, the company secured public sector 
contracts and grew rapidly to 4,000 staff. In 2006 the organisation decided that 
it needed to diversify to reduce dependence on public sector contracts. By floating 
on the stock exchange, with 51 per cent of shares remaining in the hands of the 
employee trust and its managers, it secured the finance to establish new operations 
in India and Canada.
In addition to its original public service goal – to reduce environmental mismanage-
ment and address issues of fuel poverty – the company uses a Partners’ Council to 
discuss personnel issues, company performance and communication with the 
executive board. In 1993 it also set up the Eaga Partnership Charitable Trust which 
draws income from the trading organisation and has invested £3 million in projects 
and research to develop knowledge about fuel poverty.
In 2011, Eaga plc was acquired by Carillion plc and became Carillion Energy 
Services. This was made possible by trustees who agreed to replace Eaga plc 
shares with Carillion plc shares. However, many of the decisions relating to the 
sale of the company were taken without the support or involvement of staff 
(Mason, 2011). After a petition and staff survey by the Partners’ Council revealed 
widespread discontent, Carillion agreed to share wealth with trust beneficiaries 
(Tighe, 2011). 
(Continued)
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Carillion Energy Services continues under private ownership. The Eaga Trust, the 
EBT run for the benefit of former Eaga staff, still exists and continues to champion 
employee ownership by providing grants for skill development, and loan/equity 
finance up to £500,000 to former members of Eaga plc to start their own employee-
owned business (Tighe, 2012). However, the case study about Eaga plc on the 
website of the Employee Ownership Association was removed following the takeover.
Original source: www.employeeownership.co.uk/case-studies.htm#EagaPartnership, 
updated using press reports by Mason (2011) and Tighe (2011, 2012).
For further international examples, see the companion website at: www.sagepub.
co.uk/ridleyduff. 
(Continued)
Solidarity enterprises (CMEs) are more dependent than other private sector organisa-
tions on a profitable track record or asset base to secure loans that can finance the 
development of a trust (EBT) (Spear, 1999). In such an arrangement, most (or all) of 
the shares are initially held in trust, then subsequent annual surpluses are used to buy 
shares and distribute them to individual share accounts, or permit individuals to buy 
shares using their own money. In some cases (e.g. Scott Bader, see Case 1.1), a 
charitable trust rather than EBT owns the company, and staff bonuses are matched by 
contributions to charitable projects (Paton, 2003). Providing 50 per cent (+1) of shares 
with control rights remain in trust, and there is an embedded mechanism issuing new 
shares to individual member accounts, a profitable company cannot be acquired by 
outside investors against the wishes of its members (SEC, n.d.).
Co-operative transformation of the private sector
The application of these techniques has resulted both in the growth and greater 
resilience of worker co-operatives and employee-owned businesses that exhibit the 
characteristics of SRBs and CMEs (Erdal, 2011; CECOP-CICOPA Europe, 2015). In the 
Basque region of Spain, there is a well-developed approach to acquiring private 
companies and transforming them into CMEs with SRB characteristics. The journal 
extract in Case 3.3 is based on findings from a study involving a field trip to Spain 
(Ridley-Duff, 2005). It describes a meeting with Mikel Lezamiz, the director of the 
Mondragon Management School, in which he talks about the process of acquiring 
private companies.
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Case 3.3
The Mondragon Co-operative Corporation (MCC)
A longer teaching case and exercise can be found on the companion website at: 
www.sagepub.co.uk/ridleyduff.
The Mondragon Co-operative Corporation was established in the late 1950s by 
a priest and five engineers after they were denied the opportunity to invest in the 
company that employed them. In 2003 the United Nations celebrated the social 
and economic achievements of the corporation they created. By 2009 this had 
grown to over 100,000 staff, with over 80 per cent of ownership by staff on the 
basis of one person, one vote. During a field trip, Mikel Lezamiz – the director of 
the Management School in Mondragon – described how staff in the MCC work 
with staff in a newly acquired company to transform it into a co-operative. He 
discusses this as a gradual transition:
•	 a move from private to employee ownership•	 a shift from employee ownership to participative management•	 the introduction of co-operative management (elected councils)•	 a vote to transfer the business into co-operative ownership.
Employee ownership is seen only as the start of a much longer process. The main 
goal is co-operative management and ownership (which can take many years to 
achieve). As an example, he talked about eDesa, a company the local council asked 
MCC to buy (to save 1,000 jobs). It took from 1989 to 1994 to educate and pre-
pare the workforce to take a vote on their own future. In 1994, the workforce voted 
by 87 per cent to 13 per cent to convert to a co-op (via a vote in a General 
Assembly). At eDesa, the reaction of trade unions was interesting. Two were sup-
portive; two were sceptical but eventually came around. With the backing of all 
four unions, the company eventually converted to a co-operative. Even now the 
unions still have an ‘ambiguous’ attitude to the MCC. Nevertheless, many union 
members (about 100 people) are active in disseminating information on the values 
and principles of the co-operative.
Source: Journal transcript, 6 March 2003, Mondragon Co-operative Corporation
Mikel Lezamiz contended that it can take between five and ten years before a work-
force develops the readiness to completely take over both ownership and control of 
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their enterprise (i.e. embed co-operative management into an organisation, and then 
convert to a co-operative legal form). Interestingly, he distinguished the progression 
process as: employee ownership (financial participation); participative management 
(the introduction of soft HRM practices); co-operative management (putting in place 
elected governing and social councils to take decisions alongside an executive man-
agement group); and co-operative ownership (transferring assets and membership to a 
co-operative legal entity). At Mondragon, development involves a close relationship 
with the Caja Laboral Popular (Bank of the People’s Labour). A contract of association 
setting out the governance arrangements for the co-operative is needed before the 
bank provides financial support and ongoing business advice (Turnbull, 2002).
These examples raise substantive issues in terms of the politics of social enterprise 
development. The linking of a charity to a company form does not necessarily involve 
a fundamental shift in authority relations; both rest on social norms and bodies of law 
that institute a unitary board, top-down authority and rhetorical injunctions to 
exclude or limit the involvement of employees in both ownership and governance. 
The transition to employee ownership and control is more radical as it has the poten-
tial to restructure authority relations at the level of class (Kalmi, 2007; Erdal, 2011). 
Traditional notions of investor ownership, management control and ‘employment’ are 
so deeply embedded in the consciousness of investors, managers and employees that 
it should not be a surprise that it takes years to relinquish and replace them with new 
ways of thinking. Often, new attitudes cannot be developed without the experience 
of active participation (or observation) of enterprises with embedded member ownership 
(Knell, 2008).2
But it is not only member-owners that may take years to prepare for such a change. 
The modes of thought associated with investor-led and hierarchically controlled enter-
prise are deeply ingrained in the training and professional development of business 
support staff, academics, accountants, trade unionists, bankers, funders and lawyers. 
Current course curricula and assessment strategies for professions reinforce dominant 
approaches to accounting, management, learning and dispute resolution (Johnson, 
2003) and this leads to the kind of changes that have occurred at the Co-operative 
Group (The Guardian, 2014b). To support worker, consumer and community owner-
ship, old ways of thinking may need to be relinquished completely, or substantially 
modified, to provide effective support (Restakis, 2010; Erdal, 2011; Birchall, 2012). If they 
are not (or cannot), SRBs retain private sector characteristics that limit their capacity to 
align fully with principles of sustainable development (Novkovic and Webb, 2014).
Moreover, the expectations that spring from worker ownership, as set out by 
Ellerman (1990), involve the political challenge of a workforce (as a whole) accepting 
responsibility for both the assets and the liabilities of their enterprises. While acquiring 
responsibility for assets (cash, investments, property, equipment, etc.) is a psycho-
logical barrier relatively easy to overcome, developing the confidence to accept 
responsibility for liabilities is harder (i.e. paying staff, suppliers and creditors, and 
assuming legal responsibility for fellow workers).
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The key contribution of Ellerman (1982, 1984, 1990) to the question of whether 
worker ownership constitutes social enterprise comes from his argument that it is a 
socialised form of entrepreneurship fostered by personal non-transferable member 
ownership rights, rather than transferable property rights. 
As Ellerman argues:
The old public/private distinction is supported by both capitalists and state-socialists. The 
former use it to argue that the idea of democracy is inapplicable to private industry, and 
the latter use it to argue that democracy can only come to industry by nationalizing it. But 
both arguments are incorrect, and the public/private distinction itself must be recast. The 
word ‘private’ is used in two senses: (1) ‘private’ in the sense of being non-governmental, 
and (2) ‘private’ in the sense of being based on private property. Let us drop the first mean-
ing and retain the second. Similarly ‘public’ is used in two senses: (1) ‘public’ in the sense 
of being governmental, and (2) ‘public’ in the sense of being based on personal rights. Let 
us use the second meaning and take it as the definition of ‘social’ (instead of ‘public’). Thus 
we have the suggested redefinitions:
Social institution   = based on personal rights
Private organisation = based on property rights
By these redefinitions, a democratic firm is a social institution (while still being ‘private’ 
in the other sense of being not of the government), while a capitalist corporation is a 
private firm (not because it is also non-governmental but because it is based on property 
rights). (1997: 38)
For Ellerman, an enterprise becomes social when it rejects private property rights as 
the rationale for participation in management and governance.3 Whether an organisa-
tion is not-for-profit, non-profit, more-than-profit or for-profit is not the issue. What 
matters is the basis on which participation rights are granted: in a private (economy) 
enterprise, membership is granted when private property rights are purchased; in a 
social (economy) enterprise, membership is granted when people are recognised for 
their labour and trading contributions.
Class exercise: Political norms in private and  
social enterprise
Find a short video clip of Dragons’ Den and/or The Apprentice that has been 
broadcast in your country (or use the examples below). These should enable stu-
dents to consider the assumptions embedded in the neo-liberal formulation of 
the private sector and write out the ‘rules of private enterprise’ (e.g. individual 
(Continued)
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entrepreneurship, equity investments, profit sharing, investor control, absolute 
owner authority, management hierarchy, business planning, target setting, etc.). 
If you wish, you can use one or both of the following YouTube clips:
Dragons’ Den: www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiEOd7Ks8xk 
The Apprentice: www.youtube.com/watch?v=sLVJ0mUa3xI 
1 Based on these clips, set students the task of ‘writing out the political norms of 
private enterprise’ or ‘writing out the norms of neo-liberalism’ (depending on 
course context).
Distribute The Dragons’ Apprentice to students (you can download it from: www.
sagepub.co.uk/ridleyduff). Get students to read it (if doing the task in two 
consecutive classes), or get them to read Chapter 4 ‘Warren Enters the Dragons 
Cave’, pp. 12–21) if doing the task in a single lecture/seminar.
2 Based on this reading, set the students the task of ‘writing out the political 
norms of social enterprise’ or ‘writing out the norms of the social and solidarity 
economy’ (depending on the course context).
Do a systematic comparison with the students to help them make connections 
between political thought and macro-economic systems to the inner workings of 
individual enterprises. With post-graduate students, you might attempt to write out 
the ‘rules of CTAs, SRBs and CMEs’ to gain a deeper insight into the extent that 
each retains or rejects the ‘rules of private enterprise’. 
(Continued)
Using producer, worker and community ownership to 
oppose globalisation
As noted in Chapter 1, the creation of a social and solidarity economy is a conscious 
political act (Sahakian and Dunand, 2014). In the remainder of this chapter, we con-
sider international examples of social enterprise development that represent political 
acts using business techniques: the first is fair trade in Latin America, Africa and Asia; 
the second is micro-finance in Bangladesh; the third is the recovered company 
movement in Argentina.
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Fair trade
Fair trade was pioneered in the 1960s and institutionalised in the 1980s through the 
creation of a Mexican-Dutch project that resulted in the incorporation of the Fairtrade 
Foundation. It defines an approach to trading that limits the impact of market prices 
to increase opportunities for co-operative and community development (Lacey, 2009). 
While fair trade depends on global supply chains (and operates globally), it modifies 
market operations and subordinates them to human needs by altering the norms 
embedded in trading relationships. It does this by advancing a number of fair trade 
‘principles’ (Doherty et al., 2013).
As Jones’s (2000) study of Traidcraft reveals, the motive to initiate fair trade 
enterprises is frequently grounded in political and religious ethics. These incline entre-
preneurs to actively limit the influence of the market in the supply and distribution 
of goods, and also inspires commitments to transforming labour relations through 
co-operative ownership (Lacey, 2009). Distributors of fair trade products pay a mini-
mum price to ensure they do not fall so low that producers cannot develop their 
communities (Nicholls and Opal, 2004). Unlike past colonial ventures based on the acqui-
sition of land, and master–servant industrial relations (Melman, 2001), fair trade seeks the 
creation of local social and solidarity enterprises that produce goods co-operatively for 
advanced markets. It builds into prices a social premium that pays for infrastructure 
development in producer communities (such as water, health and education facilities).
Davies et al. (2010) discuss the advantages that this ethical form of business accorded 
Café Direct, and how the ownership of the supply chain came to be shared with produc-
ers (who are mostly based in Africa). Doing so not only redistributes financial capital but 
also creates social capital. Sustainability is achieved through the cultivation of social net-
works, particularly in public and third sector procurement and retailing activities. 
Through these approaches, Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) ‘fictitious goods’ of land, money and 
people acquire a changed status. Land is treated as a source of wealth, not a commodity: 
it remains a productive asset under the control of community institutions and producer 
co-operatives. Working relationships are oriented towards stakeholder engagement with 
ownership structured to provide both economic and social returns. In place of wage-
labour within a private corporation, most income is derived from dividends paid to small 
(independent) producers based on the amount of produce sold through a co-operative.
Nevertheless, fair trade has encountered a number of problems. Firstly, the quality 
demands of western retailers can have the effect of imposing high entry costs that are 
prohibitive. This had led to a proliferation of alternative fair trade standards and lim-
ited the geographical reach of the Fairtrade mark (Lacey, 2009). Secondly, and perhaps 
more significantly, it has proved harder to put some ‘principles’ into practice than 
others, sometimes due to the overheads of implementing them (such as transparent 
sourcing), but also because the market success of fair trade has attracted multinational 
corporations into the field (Doherty et al., 2013). 
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MNCs have successfully penetrated the fair trade movement and secured influence on 
the boards of accreditation organisations. This increases their lobbying power to dilute 
the ‘principles’ by reintroducing plantations that employ labourers (albeit with com-
mitments to ILO labour standards). These changes compromise earlier commitments 
to co-operative production by limiting the expansion of member ownership and rein-
troducing the master–servant arrangements of colonial occupation. So the fair trade 
movement is now split between CMEs that socialise ownership of land and production 
and who involve local communities in development (as at Divine Chocolate), and 
MNCs (acting as SRBs) who buy up land and put it (back) under private ownership 
with wage-labourers running plantations.
Table 3.2 The change in fair trade principles over time
Principle Change over time
1. Minimum prices Minimum price higher than market price. Has not always kept pace with inflation
2. Social premium 10% of overall cost, paid over and above market price. Premiums hard to distribute 
fairly without adherence to principle 7 (democracy)
3. Long-term relationships 
and supply contracts
Build trust and mutual respect: completely ignored by major retailers who contract 
only for one season
4. Direct/transparent 
purchasing from producers
Show full and direct supply chain: never policed and abandoned in 2008 under 
pressure from multinationals
5. Pre-financial for producers Advance payments at critical time: suspended in 2008 as a principle, but revived by 
some large retailers
6. Market information for 
producers
Improve trust and relationship quality with producers: adhered to in jointly owned 
ventures; elsewhere poor producer representation
7. Democratic structures Co-operative production and/or ILO practices: more effective in co-ops; plantations 
just pay minimum wage – no local democracy
8. Consumer education Not audited, but frequently practised: still active through Fairtrade mark
9. Sustainable production Little information on prevalence and practice: not currently enforced
Class exercise: Fair trade and endogenous  
development
Watch the following video clip about fair trade co-operatives in South America: 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=yu5DhOHLJ-s 
Based on this clip, consider the following issues:
1 What western business norms are modified by the social and solidarity economy?
2 What charitable norms are modified by the social and solidarity economy?
3 How would you explain ‘endogenous development’ to another person?
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Despite challenges, the Fairtrade brand remains widely recognised and highly trusted. 
The Fairtrade Foundation claims that over 60 per cent of people trust Fairtrade (a level 
that is as high as charities, co-operatives and SMEs generally) and that nearly 60 per 
cent of consumers in 24 countries recognised the brand by 2011. Sales (in the UK 
alone) exceed £1 billion, securing its position as the world’s leading ethical brand. 
(GlobalScan, 2011)
The Grameen Bank and recovered company movements
We now consider two further examples: the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the 
empresas recuperadas (recovered companies) in Argentina. These have been selected 
for different reasons. The Grameen Bank has been particularly effective in transform-
ing the lives of the rural poor (Bornstein, 1996). Academic studies are helpful in 
problematising and assessing the socio-economic contribution of the Grameen Bank, 
not just within Bangladesh, but also to the micro-finance movement around the world 
( Jain, 1996; Dowla, 2006). The Grameen Bank’s underlying model not only calls into 
question the political assumptions that underpin lending (based on property owner-
ship), but also illustrates how a bank can build social capital by organising in a 
particular way.
The recovered company movement in Argentina has been selected for a different 
reason. It shows how the industrial working class can respond to globalisation in 
urban settings (The Take, 2004; Klein, 2007). In this case, the concept of expropriation 
underpins a new social arrangement that permits the occupation of an abandoned or 
idle factory in order to continue or restart production (Howarth, 2007). The political 
significance is that this challenges business norms regarding the primacy of property 
rights, and creates an embryonic legal system that permits the protection of jobs and 
communities against the effects of globalisation (Ranis, 2005). Let us start with the 
Grameen Bank.
The Grameen Bank was established by Muhammad Yunus as an action research 
project in 1976 (Yunus, 2007). It was constituted as a bank working exclusively with 
the ‘rural poor’ in 1983. There are two key aspects of the Grameen Bank’s expansion 
that are highly significant. Firstly, after 20 years of operation, the bank claimed that it 
achieved a default rate on loans of only 2 per cent with the poorest sections of the 
community ( Jain, 1996). Such a default rate for credit is extremely low, even in an 
‘advanced’ economy, so this finding alone created interest in the Grameen Bank’s 
approach. It also confounded assumptions that property is needed as collateral (assets 
that can be turned into cash) to mitigate risks when lending to ‘high-risk’ borrowers. 
Secondly, the Grameen Bank’s approach to banking has contributed to the creation of 
social capital and a culture of community-based welfare. In doing so, there have been 
notable impacts on the social status of women, due to the level of successful lending 
to them (Dowla, 2006).
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Class exercise: The Grameen Bank – a first look
Watch the following video clip about the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh: 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MrUQKuvsmvw&feature=fvw 
Based on this clip, consider the following issues:
1 What are the key challenges faced by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh?
2 Critically assess the way that ‘social collateral’ is used to guarantee loan 
repayments.
3 Critically assess Yunus’s political goal of ‘creating a world without poverty’.
Jain (1996) explores the institutional arrangements that produce low default rates 
among borrowers. The bank has been lauded for its use of ‘social collateral’ (the group 
guarantees to repay a loan if one group member misses a repayment). Jain argues, 
however, that the low default rate cannot be attributed to this policy alone. In practice, 
it was found that Grameen Bank workers and managers do not enforce the group 
guarantee scheme. The lending policies, he argues, are similar to co-operative banking 
institutions that have much higher default rates; an explanation has to be found in the 
internal working arrangements of the bank, rather than its lending policies.
Borrowers are organised into groups of five people. Each group elects a ‘chief’. The 
members of each group cannot come from the same family. They undergo seven days 
of training on bank policy and the role played by members. Once a group forms – 
much like any other credit union – they have to establish a track record of saving 
before being granted any credit. In the first instance, two members of each group 
receive credit – the creditworthiness of the other group members depends on the first 
two borrowers’ repayment record.
A bank centre comprises ten groups. Each week a bank worker visits the group to 
collect repayments and consider new applications for credit. Studies reveal that the 
weekly meeting is vitally important, as it establishes social norms and rituals to reinforce 
a culture of regular saving and prompt repayment (Dowla, 2006). New applications for 
credit and regular repayments take place with all members of the centre present (50 
people): they are not conducted in private (as is the norm in westernised banking insti-
tutions). Jain (1996) reports that these arrangements influence both borrowers and bank 
workers. Financial and procedural discipline comes both from the bottom-up control of 
members (who will challenge deviations from bank policy) and top-down checks that 
are routinely carried out by branch and area managers.
Dowla (2006) considers key challenges that were overcome during the growth of 
the Grameen Bank. Muhammad Yunus, then an economist in Chittagong, encountered 
resistance from other bankers, as well as political interference from religious groups 
and politicians. 
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When a supportive finance minister proposed a separate bank to expand the Grameen 
experiment, the commercial bankers put up all possible hurdles […] When the bank first 
attempted to introduce housing loans, the Central Bank resisted, arguing that the bank 
can provide credit only for productive purposes … Grameen Bank countered by suggest-
ing that a house is like a factory building where all household-based production occurs 
and as such owning a house is an important input of production in addition to being 
consumption. On one occasion the bank received a terse letter asking it to justify why 
the majority of the borrowers of the bank were women. Professor Yunus retorted that the 
central bank itself ought to justify why the majority of [its] borrowers … were men. 
(Dowla, 2006: 105)
Culturally, the struggle was not only to convince political institutions and commercial 
bankers that the scheme was viable. It also involved convincing the poor:
The poor could not believe that a government sponsored bank could be seriously 
interested in their welfare … [Yunus] had to struggle to convince the eligible women to 
accept credit … they would not go in [front] of him because of the purdah norm, so he 
ended up talking with them with a screen … Moreover, they were reluctant to accept 
credit because … they had been taught that money is something that should be handled 
by men only. (Dowla, 2006: 106)
Further obstacles came from the spread of local rumours about Christian missionaries, 
socialist plots and jail sentences for defaulters. Mainstream institutions questioned the 
business model and accounting practices, claiming that they hid the true level of 
defaults (Pearl and Philips, 2001).
The progress of the Grameen Bank, however, has been transformative on a number 
of levels. Firstly, it used share ownership by members to build trust that the bank would 
not be taken over by governmental or private interests. From registration in 1983, over 
the course of 20 years, members’ share of capital has increased from 40 per cent to over 
90 per cent. Dowla (2006: 112) describes this as ‘an absolutely new norm of corporate 
governance for Bangladesh’. Secondly, through successful lending, subsidiary companies 
(e.g. Grameen Telecom) have contributed to changes in the status and role of women in 
the community. Bangladesh and Islamic laws enabling women to own property had been 
limited by social custom (Subramanian, 1998). The Grameen Bank’s lending activities 
have increased not only the property holdings of women, but also the educational oppor-
tunities for both their sons and their daughters. A practice of addressing members by 
name at meetings means that many women are now known by other members of their 
community as individuals, no longer merely as someone’s sister, wife or daughter.
The Grameen Bank rewrites the textbook on risk management by demonstrating 
that lending against assets and property is a political and ideological choice (to privi-
lege those who possess property), and not one based on intrinsic economic and social 
benefit or improved commercial performance (Ellerman, 2005). Banking practices 
using social collateral, backed by processes that deliberately build social capital 
through participatory economics (Albert, 2003), produce lower default rates on loan 
repayments than commercial banks’ lending to wealthier clients.
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The conclusions from the Grameen Bank on social collateral and alternative forms 
of organisation provide a useful starting point for our second discussion: the develop-
ment of the social and solidarity economy in Argentina. Unlike Bangladesh, which is 
one of the poorest countries in the world, Argentina has twice been on the verge of 
joining the ‘first’ world. Firstly, in 1910, its GDP per capita was ahead of France and 
Germany, and second only to the industrial economies in the British Empire (Della 
Paolera and Taylor, 2004). By the 1970s, it was again the strongest economy in South 
America, this time interrupted by a military coup (Klein, 2007). Following the 1970s 
coup, economic advisers, schooled in neo-liberal economic theory, visited Argentina 
to help establish regimes committed to a policy of ‘free’ markets. As became the norm 
during this period, foreign investment (loans from the IMF or World Bank) was often 
conditional on making public assets available for private acquisition.
The effects of the ‘liberalisation’ programme in Argentina have been well docu-
mented (Klein, 2007; Howarth, 2007). By 2001, many millions of jobs had been lost 
and the number of jobless poor had risen from 18 per cent (in 1994) to over 50 per cent 
(in 2001). In response, both rural and industrialised regions of Argentina have started 
to establish initiatives that promote self-management. 
Class exercise: Recovered companies in Argentina
Additional materials and exercises are available on the companion 
website at: www.sagepub.co.uk/ridleyduff.
Watch these video excerpts (The Take, 2004): 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMnUkOB4fIE (Part 1)
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ypq1SAvvot8 (Part 3)
Based on a comparison of these clips with earlier clips about Venezuela and 
Bangladesh, consider the following issues:
1 How do the political contexts of rural and urban social enterprises differ?
2 What is the political significance of the social capital that rural and urban social 
enterprises develop?
3 What is the political significance of the ‘recovered company movement’ in relation 
to the property rights of capital?
In cities, a radical approach based on ‘recovered companies’ was spreading outwards 
from Buenos Aires to other parts of South America (Trigona, 2006; Klein, 2007; Hirtz 
and Giacone, 2013). Hirtz and Giacone (2013) trace the origins of the movement to 
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rebellions against factory closures between 1993 and 2002. Lewis and Klein (The Take, 
2004) documented how this accelerated after a financial crisis in 2001. Mervyn Wilson, 
in the introduction to Howarth’s report comments that:
The workers’ response was instinctive – to work together to safeguard jobs, and the skills 
and competencies on which their livelihoods and those of their communities depended. 
They did not know of, did not work with, and did not draw upon the vast collective 
memory and experience of the global co-operative movement. They simply organised 
collectively to take over and keep the businesses running … As in the early nineteenth 
century, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between what we would consider today 
to be the realm of trade union activities and those of a co-operative. (Howarth, 2007: 5)
This study is useful for understanding how and why groups of industrialised workers 
reacted to the effects of globalisation. It supports Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) argument that 
whenever ‘free’ (i.e. international) markets start to dominate, the effect on local econ-
omies is highly variable. Industrialised economies (or regions) benefit from a transfer 
of wealth, while job losses and political repression occur in weaker economies (or 
regions). In Argentina, this took the form of political action to break up organised 
labour and protest movements during a second wave of ‘liberalisation’ in 1994. The 
effects, however, devastated employment among skilled and unskilled workers, lead-
ing to the formation of a ‘new co-operative’ movement.
Spontaneously, initially without government or international support, workforces 
started taking over abandoned factories to resume production. They were able to do 
this under laws that allow a co-operative to secure court permission to use idle equip-
ment for a two-year period. Local courts upheld by-laws that require former owners 
to negotiate with co-operative members over the rental and purchase of abandoned 
equipment. In other cases, local government authorities bought the assets and leased 
them back to the co-operatives.
One high-profile case is Zanon, a ceramics factory that has grown to 300 staff and 
achieved international recognition. Due to high levels of community support, it has 
survived six attempts to restore ownership to its previous (private) owners (The Take, 
2004), and in 2009 members were granted ownership by the provincial legislature 
(Trigona, 2009). As Ranis points out:
There are multiple examples of recuperated factories lending their facilities to the 
surrounding communities for health clinics, art exhibits, theatre evenings, and adult learn-
ing centres with university faculty providing courses for credit (the author visited several 
such factory culture programmes in the city of Buenos Aires). These neighbourhood and 
community contacts stood them in good stead when threatened with police interventions 
on behalf of the previous owners. (Ranis, 2005: 106)
Howarth (2007) explains the use of expropriation, the legal basis for occupying and 
claiming the assets of an abandoned factory. In liberal economies, the rights of 
property dominate: if there is a conflict between defending a person’s right to dispose 
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of their property or defending the jobs of a workforce, the rights of the property 
owner are given priority. In Argentina, the law now recognises – in the case of recov-
ered companies in Buenos Aires – that there are circumstances where the rights of a 
person to support their family and community can take precedence over the rights of 
property owners. As Ranis (2005) argues, Argentine and regional governments have 
constitutional provisions that allow co-operatives (and only co-operatives) to expro-
priate properties for reasons of ‘public utility’, or in defence of the ‘common good’. 
This is different both from liberal economies (such as the US and UK) and also from 
expropriation by the state to nationalise whole industries (as happened in countries 
dominated by Marxian economic thinking).
In summarising the cases of the Grameen Bank and Argentine co-operatives, it is 
easy to highlight their different development paths and contexts. However, it is the 
similarities to material in the previous chapters we wish to emphasise. Firstly, both 
approaches were dependent on the development of community-based social capital 
that emphasised solidarity. Furthermore, the strength of this social capital empowered 
the social enterprises to defend their institutional arrangements from interference by 
powerful commercial and state interests. Secondly, in both cases, the organisations 
changed the economic ‘rules’ that govern property and employment rights. At 
Grameen, consumer ownership of the bank (to invest in their own production activi-
ties) led to a different relationship between lenders and borrowers because members 
were making decisions on both lending and borrowing at the same time. In Argentina, 
employment rights were superseded by member ownership rights and responsibilities, 
transforming the relationship between workers and the machinery needed to sustain 
production. Property was subordinated to labour (and public) interest, rather than the 
reverse. Lastly, in both cases the ‘local struggles are a direct result of national and 
international policies and of the global context’ (Ranis, 2005: 115). Social enterprises 
acted to re-localise control and ownership, and reclaim the wealth generated locally. 
In Grameen, the struggle was against the poverty created by globalisation in rural 
communities. In Argentina, the struggle was against urban unemployment created by 
the ‘liberalisation’ policies that accompany globalisation. From this, we can draw some 
conclusions about social enterprise as innovatory work.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have considered the roots of globalisation and various responses 
to it. In particular, we have examined social entrepreneurship through the agencies of 
the state (through enacting the doctrines of NPM) and through private sector reforms 
(through enacting the principles of fair trade). Both approaches create SRBs and 
CMEs, rather than CTAs, although there is evidence that CTAs are integral to the fair 
trade system through their role in allocating fair trade premiums for community devel-
opment. We have also considered how NPM can trigger ‘local socialism’ through a 
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community-based business movement that advances both NPG in the state sector and 
employee-owned/community enterprises that extend participation rights to more citizens 
through the creation of a social economy. 
While the literature on social enterprise from 2005 onwards is well populated with 
discussions about the impact of ‘business practices’ on the voluntary and charity sector 
(Goerke, 2003; Seanor et al., 2013), this chapter has focused on an argument estab-
lished much earlier in practice that ‘social enterprise’ comprises commercial activity 
where ownership and control rights are allocated (primarily) to member-owners, and 
particularly to producer-owners. The danger, particularly in an Anglo-American con-
text, is that this older CME tradition of social enterprise is weakened by the political 
power of governments who prefer to control public services through SRBs and CTAs 
(Peattie and Morley, 2008), and also by the private sector who see more profit potential 
in SRBs than either CTAs or CMEs. So, while ambiguity in approaches may broaden its 
appeal, it also reinforces structures that lead to competition over the underlying prem-
ises and assumptions that drive social enterprise development. This inherent pluralism, 
however, has been cast as a strength of the sector by a number of writers who – as 
Polanyi did – see some merit in building a market for ‘real’ goods, eliminating markets 
for ‘fictitious’ goods, and re-enfranchising member ownership as part of a mixed 
economy (Restakis, 2010; Smith and Teasdale, 2012; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2013).
Taken together, Chapters 1 to 3 review the full range of social, political and eco-
nomic changes that are contributing to the emergence of social enterprise as both a 
concept and process of organising. We see evidence that there is both convergence 
(on member ownership models) and divergences (in orientations towards profits and 
markets). However, we close the chapter with an activity based on the words of David 
Ellerman who believed that localisation through democratic firms could forge 
something positive irrespective of pre-existing political commitments.
Class exercise: The work and writings  
of David Ellerman
Materials to support this exercise can be found on the companion website at: www.
sagepub.co.uk/ridleyduff.
Read the following statement from The Democratic Worker-owned Firm 
(Ellerman, 1990):
A capitalist economy within a political democracy can evolve to an economy of 
economic democracy by extending the principle of democratic self-determination  
(Continued)
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to the workplace. It would be viewed by many as the perfection of capitalism 
since it replaces the demeaning employer–employee relationship with owner-
ship and co-entrepreneurship for all the workers. A state socialist economy 
can evolve into an economic democracy by restructuring itself along the lines 
of the self-management socialist tradition. It would be viewed by many as 
the perfection of socialism since the workers would finally become masters of 
their own destiny in firms organised as free associations of producers.
1 To what extent is the USA extending the principle of ‘democratic self-determination 
to the workplace’ through the widespread use of ESOPs?
2 To what extent can ‘self-management in the socialist tradition’ support new 
forms of CMEs and SRBs?
3 What factors in neo-liberal doctrine inhibit the development of ‘firms organised 
as free associations of producers’ as envisaged by Ellerman?
(Continued)
Summary of learning
In this chapter, we have argued that:
The rise of NPM as a supply-side economic policy replaced Keynesianism. This has 
accelerated the adoption of private sector accounting and management practices.
The application of NPM in public sector reform has resulted in arguments for social 
entrepreneurship and employee mutuals in the development of public services.
The concept of ‘local socialism’ arose to resist NPM by stimulating community 
economic development: local enterprise networks deploying fair trade, co-operatives 
and employee ownership are part of the switch to NPG.
Restructuring authority relations at the level of class can take five to ten years 
because it takes a long time to replace investor-led, hierarchically organised 
governance with worker-led and/or community-led democratic governance.
A movement for ‘economic and social democracy’ is being enacted through 
social enterprises that restructure authority relations in business activities 
supported by laws that permit the expropriation of private assets for public/
community benefit.
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Questions and possible essay assignments
1. Using examples to illustrate your argument, explain the basis of Ellerman’s 
contention that all member-controlled businesses are social, rather than private, 
organisations.
2. ‘The switch to new public management was the principal catalyst for social entrepre-
neurship in the public sector.’ Using examples, evaluate the robustness of this claim.
3. ‘Social enterprise is primarily about democratising public and private organisations, 
not transforming charities and voluntary groups into businesses with a social purpose.’ 
Using examples, critically assess this statement.
4. What is the legacy of ‘local socialism’ to the social enterprise movement?
Further reading
A good place for undergraduates to start is ‘Ten big questions about the Big Society’ 
(Coote, 2010) available from the NEF website. Then students will be ready to progress 
to Hood’s (1995) seminal paper on ‘new public management’, a well-argued distillation 
of the doctrines of NPM as well as its spread among OECD countries. More recent 
works by Osborne (2006) and Coule and Patmore (2013) show how NPM is now chal-
lenged by the assumptions of ‘new public governance’.
Ellerman’s (1990) book The Democratic Worker-owned Firm is now freely down-
loadable (as The Democratic Corporation) from Ellerman’s own website. Parts of the 
text are challenging to non-economists, but it is notable how many influential people 
in the world of employee ownership look to Ellerman’s initial analysis as a source of 
inspiration (so it is worth the struggle). Ellerman establishes a clear moral, economic 
and intellectual justification for worker ownership as the basis of social enterprise. For 
technical discussions (useful to accountants and solicitors) see Gordy et al.’s (2013) 
book Leveraged ESOPs and Employee Buyouts, available from the National Center for 
Employee Ownership (in the USA).
A key text to understand how ‘economic democracy’ is being exported from the US 
to other parts of the world is Gates’s The Ownership Solution (1998). Both Gates’s work 
on legal forms, and Shann Turnbull’s work on governance practice, have been an influ-
ence on the members of the National Center for Employee Ownership (in the US) and 
the Employee Ownership Association (EOA) in the UK. The EOA’s website contains a 
series of helpful publications, parliamentary reports and case studies on how to imple-
ment ‘economic democracy’ in the UK (see www.employeeownership.co.uk).
A compelling overview of the business trajectory implied by the themes in this 
chapter is found in the final chapter of Alec Nove’s (1983) book The Economics of 
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Feasible Socialism. Despite its age, Nove’s final chapter on the potentialities and limi-
tations of a society in which private, social and state enterprise are combined in 
different proportions to increase human well-being stands the test of time. For a more 
recent critical debate about the intersection between for-profit and non-profit views 
on social enterprise, see Bull’s editorial in the 2008 Special Issue of the International 
Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research (IJEBR).
On the companion website, we suggest four further articles and a novella to stimu-
late further debate about the politics of social enterprise. Firstly, we recommend 
Osborne’s overview of the switch from public administration to NPM, then NPM to 
NPG. Secondly, we recommend Smith and Teasdale’s arguments for associative democ-
racy and its potential role in further reform of public services. Thirdly, we recommend 
Sepulveda’s historical account of social enterprise development in the 1980s and 1990s 
to provide a political-historical link with NPM/NPG. Fourthly, we recommend Coule 
and Patmore’s paper about the innovations of TSOs responding to the shifts towards 
NPM and NPG. Lastly, on a more light-hearted note, we provide a satirical critique of 
neo-liberalism in the form of novella by one of the authors – The Dragons’ Apprentice 
by Ridley-Duff (2014). 
Further reading material is available on the companion website at: www.sagepub.
co.uk/ ridleyduff.
Useful resources
The Corporation (documentary): www.thecorporation.com/ 
FairShares Association: www.fairshares.coop 
Fairtrade Foundation: www.fairtrade.org.uk/ 
Fairtrade International: www.fairtrade.net/ 
International Labour Organisation: www.ilo.org/empent/units/cooperatives/ 
Mondragon (documentary): www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zMvktpKDmo
New Economics Foundation: www.neweconomics.org/
OneWorld: http://us.oneworld.net/ 
The Political Compass: www.politicalcompass.org/ 
Positive Money: www.positivemoney.org/ 
Shift Change (documentary): http://shiftchange.org/ 
Skoll World Forum: http://skollworldforum.org/ 
The Take (documentary): www.thetake.org/ 
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Together (documentary): www.together-thedocumentary.coop/ 
Upside Down World (Latin America): http://upsidedownworld.org/ 
World Fair Trade Organization: www.wfto.com/ 
Notes
1 See Loomio.org for an example of a widely used technology that has successfully 
reduced the need for executive management and which promotes participatory 
democracy. This video provides an introduction: www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
Ij0OsRtkl2A. 
2 See Chapters 6–9 for teaching cases and discussion on the practical aspects of these 
debates.
3 In Chapter 11 we discuss in further detail the (legal) property rights defined in the 
Articles of Association of a company. They can be summarised as rights to: liquidate 
the company; acquire capital gains; transfer property; derive an income; vote on 
key decisions; access information; grant public access to information.
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